Theological skepticism

I've been reading some Pierre Bayle lately (in case you didn't gather that from my last post). I feel a kinship with the guy: he was a Calvinist who despaired at the ability of reason to do anything high-powered, including speculative theology; I'm a (quasi? ex? sort-of?) Calvinist who despairs at the ability of reason to do anything high-powered, including speculative theology. It's sorta nice to know that there are other theological skeptics out there.

Allow me to clarify my theological skepticism. First, it's source: my reasons for being a somewhat skeptical about theology arise from a general conviction I have to the effect that when it comes to matters having to do with the deep structure of reality (e.g., cosmology, human origins, metaphysics properly-speaking, most of systematic theology, etc.), our cognitive abilities are working at the very edge of (if not beyond) their capacities. As a result, any warrant we have for beliefs in these matters of inquiry is tenuous at best; it certainly doesn't reach the level necessary for knowledge. Now, I certainly have beliefs about the various topics listed above (I believe that the Big Bang happened, that evolutionary theory (partially?) explains human origins, that there aren't any composite objects, that Hell is probably more like separation from God rather than eternal conscious torment), but I am very hesitant to say that these beliefs constitute knowledge for me. And I'm inclined that if others believe these things, their believings don't constitute knowledge either. (This generalization step may be problematic, but forget about it for now.)

Second, one must be careful to distinguish the sort of skepticism I am advocating from a sort that I utterly reject, that which goes by the labels "Cartesian skepticism" or "external-world skepticism." (This was the sort of skepticism Moore undertook to refute by noting that he had hands.) I think that the usual arguments for Cartesian skepticism fail (hence, the moniker for this blog), and that I have a ton of knowledge about the external world.

Perhaps it may help to get at the distinction between Cartesian skepticism and what I have called "higher-level" skepticism by appealing to a distinction made implicitly by Descartes himself. We should distinguish between cognitio and scientia; we may translate these roughly as "animal knowledge" and "scientific knowledge," respectively. Now, do not confuse this distinction with Ernest Sosa's distinction between animal knowledge and reflective knowledge. I suspect that the sides of our distinctions perhaps overlap (in the case of animal knowledge perhaps exactly), but reflective knowledge in Sosa's epistemology has a much narrower scope: with reflective knowledge, Sosa intends to show that our animal knowledge is reflectively defensible. Scientific knowledge, as I mean it, is not intended as a kind of defensible animal knowledge; it is instead knowledge that goes beyond animal knowledge. For what animal could have knowledge of such marvelous things as quarks and leptons, or the causes of the Industrial Revolution, or the Immaculate Conception? (Perhaps possession of animal knowledge is a necessary condition on the possession of scientific knowledge. Ipse fiat.) So, my Christian skepticism derives from a more general skepticism about scientific knowledge in general.

Third, I should probably say something about the scope of my theological skepticism. As I mean it, theological skepticism is not meant to encompass the things expressed by the Nicene Creed, those things which characterize "mere" Christianity. I'd contend that those things may very well constitute animal knowledge for most (if not all) Christians. (Thank you Alvin Plantinga and William Alston for this handy li'l move.) But other things: the doctrine of condign merit, the doctrine of justification by faith (alone?), transubstantiation, double asymmetric predestination, the government theory of atonement, the inerrancy of Scripture, papal infallibility, speaking in tongues, dispensational premillenialism—I could go on forever here—are theories. Mere theories. Like String Theory is a mere theory. Things like I have just listed are things accessible only at the edge of our cognitive abilities (and perhaps accessible only beyond them).

There are a few problems with the view. I will mention them only to shrug my shoulders at them (for the time being).

First problem: it seems like you, O Silly Skeptic, have no principled distinction between Christian animal knowledge and Christian scientific (not to be confused with Christian Scientific, of course) knowledge.

Response: if what you mean by "principled distinction" is "no set of necessary and sufficient conditions for a claim to be a candidate for animal or scientific knowledge," then you're probably right. But maybe this is okay. Maybe Quine was right when he said that science and common sense are located along a continuum, with no clear division between the two. I'd say something similar: animal and scientific knowledge (including that of the Christian type) lie along a continuum, no clear break obtaining between the two. I would also say, however, that I know a bit of Christian scientific knowledge when I see one (hence, my examples above).

A more serious problem is this: you might think that the Holy Spirit guides our theologizing. But if this is the case, if He will lead us into all Truth, then your Christian skepticism fizzles. (No thank you to Alvin Plantinga and William Alston for this handy li'l move.)

Maybe you're right. I'd like to see a more explicit formulation of the argument. But here's a response to the one sketched. At best, what this objection gets to is this: if the Holy Spirit wants to teach us that p, where p expresses some heavyweight theological doctrine (say, the doctrine of transubstantiation), then He will work His influence on our cognitive abilities so that we acquire warrant for our belief in the doctrine of transubstantiation. Now, I'm willing to grant the conditional. I'm unwilling to grant the antecedent. And that's what you need to run a successful objection; unfortunately, you're modus ponens has nothing to ponens.

Whew. I've been wanting to get that off my chest for a while.

Anyway, tomorrow I'm in Chicago for THRICE. I'm gonna get my post-hardcore on.